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CWBR AUTHOR INTERVIEW: THE CIVIL WAR IN THE WEST:
VICTORY AND DEFEAT FROM THE APPALACHIANS TO THE
MISSISSIPPI
Hess, Earl J.
Summer 2012

Interview with Earl J. Hess, the Stewart W. McClelland Chair in history at
Lincoln Memorial University
Interviewed by Nathan Buman
Click here for the review
Civil War Book Review (CWBR): Today, Professor Earl J. Hess, the Stewart
W. McClelland Chair in History at Lincoln Memorial University, joins me to
discuss his most recent work, The Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from
the Appalachians to the Mississippi. Professor Hess, thank you for joining me
today.
Earl Hess (EH): You're welcome and good morning. I'm happy to be here.
CWBR:You focus your study on the western armies and the activity in the
western theater. What are some of the strengths and limitations of a geographic
study of the Civil War?
EH: That's an interesting question. I think some of the strengths are that we
have a tendency, maybe, to under-appreciate the strength of regional identity in
the 1860s in America. Even though, I think a lot of people are aware of that, but
still it is good to understand why we should think about that and have some deep
awareness about what were the different characteristics of the regions of the
United States and how they conducted the war. I think there were some real
differences between the West and the East and that is why, in the book, I often
refer to the "western way" of conducting the Civil War on the part of the
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Federals. There are four to five themes that could be discussed in that regard.
One of them was an almost overwhelming self-confidence that the western
Federals developed in their ability to handle their Confederate enemy. That, as
many of the readers of Civil War military history know did not exist very well in
the East for various reasons. You have Robert E. Lee in the East, of course, and
in the West you had different Confederate commanders and you had a lot of
Confederate problems in the West versus the Confederate strengths in the East
and a lot of Union strengths in the West that countered-balanced all that sort of
thing. In terms of limitations, of doing something like this, I guess maybe you
can lose a sense of cooperation and I try to compensate for that by pointing out
the numerous ways in which the East and the West cooperated with each other,
not only the Union side but the Confederate side as well. People know about the
11th and 12th Corps coming to Chattanooga after the Union defeat at
Chickamauga in '63 but, you know, the 23rd Corps went to the East and an awful
lot of black regiments that were raised in Kentucky in 1862, most of them were
shipped to the East and served in the Army of the James which, I think, is kind of
interesting and not very well known. There was an awful lot of regional
cooperation. Most of the troops down in the Department of the Gulf were
northeastern troops instead of western troops. There were very few troops from
the western states down there in the New Orleans area.
CWBR: I wonder how is the focus on the western soldier beneficial? Did he
have a unique perspective on the war and the way that he looked at the big
picture?
EH: I think there is an argument to be made about that. I think the western
soldier, because of Shiloh, tended to feel like they were surprised at Shiloh and in
April of '62 they came close to losing but they persisted; they fought very hard,
they defeated the Confederates in battle, at least in their view. And beginning
with that and successive victories after that they developed a really, really
striking self-confidence that, I think, historians and readers ought to pay a little
more attention to as a major emotional factor in the winning of the war in the
West. Western soldiers, as they continued to be successful also were quite aware
that their compatriots in the East (I am talking about Union soldiers) were not
being successful. They read in the newspapers about defeats at Second Bull Run
and then Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville and they tended to be kind of
disgusted by that and they felt like their counterparts in blue in Virginia were not
pulling their weight in terms of winning the Civil War. And so you can see some
very striking commentary in their letters and diaries about that issue. It is not just
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the rank and file as Grant and Sherman also paid keen attention to all of that and I
think they were getting kind of disgusted by the fact that the eastern Federals
were not doing all they could do to keep Lee occupied. I think that the dispatch of
Longstreet and two divisions from the Army of Northern Virginia to help win the
Confederate victory at Chickamauga was something of a turning point in the
mindset of Grant and Sherman, feeling that after they got the situation righted at
Chattanooga in November of '63 that something really needed to be done to
better coordinate efforts East and West. And when Grant was given a chance to
command all Union forces, he really implanted that concept. If there really was a
western way of war in the Civil War, I think Grant brought it with him in March
of '64 to Virginia and, to a large degree, was successful in planting that concept
over the whole Union war effort.
CWBR: You mentioned cooperation between East and West and I wonder
what challenges did Union officers in the West have to overcome considering
their distance from Washington and how did they get the administration invested
in a war so far away when they are so concerned with defending the city itself?
EH: If anything, I think the western commanders were better off because of
the distance from Washington because they had less interference from the
politicians and I think they had a bit more freedom to develop a war effort as they
wanted to in the West. Obviously, they needed financial support; they needed
other things too, that were basic to conducting the war effort. It seems like there
is a lot less political interference in the Union war effort in the western states than
there is in Virginia. And that may well be a factor in helping to develop this
successful western way of war as opposed to the (in a degree in a way) the
unsuccessful way of conducting the war in the Virginia theater, at least before
Grant got there and kind of changed things around a little bit in the spring of '64.
I also make the point in the book that I really think that Lincoln, who, of course,
was Kentucky-born and lived in Indiana and in Illinois, he was a westerner,
through and through. He seems to have paid a lot more attention to the western
theater and was pretty keen about doing, I think, the right thing to support there.
Jefferson Davis was, of course, also western-born in Kentucky too and he lived
in Mississippi in the 1850s and et cetera, but he seemed to have paid less
attention, or at least-maybe it is not fair to say he paid less attention-but his
handling of western generals was less astute than his handling of Lee. And there
is an interesting dichotomy there between Richmond and Washington in terms of
how they viewed the West and how they handled-and the success with which
they handled-the western forces.
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CWBR: You speak a great deal about the ways that occupation challenged
the western armies. How did this influence their course of war and what did the
occupation period indicate about both Confederate morale and the ability of
Reconstruction after the war?
EH: There are some big questions here. It is a developing argument in the
literature over the past few years. A lot more interest is being drawn to
occupation problems in the Civil War, especially guerrilla activity. I did not have
room in my book to get into a really big, detailed discussion of all this but I do
not really see guerrilla activity or necessarily civilian problems, in general, as
necessarily guiding, in important ways, the general course of the way the North
fought the Civil War. That is an arguable point, of course. I really focus in my
book on things that were integral to the movement of troops across deep, large,
expansive enemy territory. How do you do that? You utilize effectively available
technology like steamboats on the river system or railroad equipment where the
rivers do not offer you the same opportunity as steamboats. And, obviously,
commanders have an awful lot of problems to deal with in terms of dealing with,
sometimes troublesome civilians or with civilians who take guns and take to the
woods and start taking pot shots at Union soldiers. If you read through the
dispatches of Union generals in the West, three-fourths, eighty percent of what
they are discussing are issues like this. And maybe only twenty to twenty-five
percent of the time they are discussing how to move troops and how to deal with
organized Confederate troops on the frontier between Union-controlled territory
and Confederate-controlled territory. But at the same time, I do not see any clear
links between anger over guerrilla attacks translating itself into a greater desire to
burn more territory or burn more resources to punish the South. That effort to try
to burn resources, to consume Confederate food yourself, that kind of stuff, all of
that is hard war policy and has a half a dozen major origins. It can range all the
way from a simple desire by young Union soldiers who are hungry and they are
not getting enough food from their commissary so they want more food so they
just naturally go out on their own to take food from civilians. That is the most
fundamental reason why you have this developing and there are other reasons.
There are real limitations to the Union supply system. The Union resources were
not inexhaustible and the ability to transport supplies was not unlimited so a lot
of times Union soldiers did go hungry because their commissaries could not
provide them with, even their regular, rations. It is true that some people did get
angry at guerrilla attacks and think that they should burn in retaliation; that, of
course, did happen too. But there are many, many different streams of meeting
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol14/iss3/26
DOI: 10.31390/cwbr.14.3.04

4

Hess: Cwbr Author Interview: The Civil War In The West: Victory And Def

that hard war policy. I disagree, for example, with Daniel Sutherland argument in
his recently-published award-winning book on the guerrilla war in the Civil War
that it was a major factor in leading to the hard war policy and in altering the
northern war effort. I am not sure that that is a supportable argument. But I think
that there were two things going on here; I do not think that they necessarily
relate to each other. It is the organization and transportation and fighting of
organized forces, won by the Union against the Confederates, but then there is a
plethora of problems that commanders had to deal with in terms of occupying the
ever-growing area of the South that Union soldiers no controlled. I think that the
Union side of the Civil War did a wonderful job winning that first problem and
never really came up with truly effective (consistently effective) policies of
dealing with the second problem. I think they experimented a lot in dealing with
occupation issues. Sometimes it worked, oftentimes it did not. In the end, it was
the ending of the organized war that finally brought peace to the occupied areas
and finally that is when guerrilla fighting completely evaporated everywhere by
1865.
CWBR: On the flip side to guerrilla warfare, you do mention, on several
occasions, where white southerners throughout the war welcome the invading
northern troops. What accounts for this and how common was that occurrence
during the war?
EH: The North would have liked to believe that there was a huge reservoir
of Loyalists in the Confederacy and, of course, in some pockets there were,
especially in East Tennessee. That, of course, the biggest example. The
overwhelming majority of southerners in the mountainous counties in eastern
Tennessee were Loyalist and vigorously Loyalist, willing to die for their beliefs.
You have a lot of Loyalists in northern Alabama and western North Carolina,
here and there. Even in some of the areas of the South that are overwhelmingly
pro-Confederate, you find a few Loyalists here and there. And, you know, the
same was true in the American Revolution where you found Loyalists to the
Crown, especially in the southern colonies in the 1770s. How do you account for
it? I am not sure that historians have answered that question; I do not think that
necessarily I have either. I actually live here in East Tennessee and so the idea of
mountain Loyalism is very keen here and people know about it and they are
interested it. I do not think that any historian has yes really dug deep enough to
try to deeply understand why that was so and they have a tendency to just, kind
of, say that it was so and look at the effects of it in the 1860s. There are a number
of different reasons. There can be some sort of anti-slave attitude and certainly it
Published by LSU Digital Commons, 2012
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is true that the mountain Loyalists detested slavery, not because they were
abolitionists but because they hated the fact that the ownership of slaves created
an elite caste in southern society and so, to a degree it is a sort of class
consciousness going on there. The East Tennessee Loyalists tended to be very
racist on top of that but that does not mean that their loyalism to the flag and the
hatred of the planter aristocracy was any less. And, to a large degree, the Union
troops were keen to seek these people out and utilize them and, of course, as
everyone knows, an awful lot of southerners served in blue. Every seceded state
contributed troops to the Union army, some of them more than others. And that
did weaken the strength of the Confederacy and its ability to opt for
independence. I do not know that it necessarily was the fatal weakness but it
certainly was one of the many weaknesses to CSA defeat, especially in the West.
One point I make in the book is that the key difference in the West is geography;
it is a huge, expansive area in the western Confederacy compared to the eastern
Confederacy and so it has a lot more different problems, a lot more different
aspects to it than the war in the East tended to.
CWBR: It seems to me that, for every stalemate that we have in the eastern
theater there is a victory and some headway made in the West by Union forces.
In terms of morale and maintaining foreign neutrality, was the West the Union
lifeline to victory overall?
EH: That is a nice way to put it. I agree with you. That is a good way to
express it. I am not sure that contemporaries, or certainly contemporaries in the
West, were keenly aware that they were winning the war. I am talking about
contemporaries so northern civilians in Illinois, Wisconsin, etc. The press in the
East tended, of course, to be focused on their region so they tended to be focused
on the stalemate and etc. And for some reason, an awful lot of foreign
governments like the many people in the British government and the French
government tended to focus on what was going in Virginia and probably did not
pay as much attention as they should have to what was taking place in the West.
So you often have scares in Washington, D.C. about British recognition and all
that sort of stuff. Henry Halleck wrote a letter to William Rosecrans in December
of '62 when Rosecrans was preparing to lead the Union army out of Nashville
against Bragg's army at Murfreesboro that resulted in the battle of Stone's River
and Halleck informed Rosecrans that Lincoln is very, very concerned that when
the British Parliament meets in January that it might recognize the CSA based on
the horrible defeats at Fredericksburg and that sort of stuff. And so they really
kind of painted a picture to Rosecrans as if his campaign in December of '62 that
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol14/iss3/26
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resulted in the battle of Stone's River might be the turning point in the Civil War.
That is recognition that if the East is doing badly the West has an opportunity to
try to take up the slack and, I think that, in the long run, that is exactly what did
happen. To me, that is one more way of seeing the West as the decisive theater of
the Civil War. And certainly it is true that, by early â€˜65, the western war is
basically won and the eastern war is not yet finished. That is, of course, a big
reason that Sherman decides to lead 60,000 tough, western Union soldiers,
veterans of many successful campaigns and battles, to Virginia to give the final
blow to Lee's hopes of holding onto Petersburg and Richmond. It is interesting to
imagine Sherman and, by that time, 80,000 (Schofield's 23rd Corps was added to
it), what would have happened if Lee had stayed at Petersburg and allowed
Sherman to join with Grant with those 80,000 troops. You would have had an
interesting development, an interesting campaign and set of battles to end the
Petersburg campaign at that stage. To me, it is a telling commentary of how
successful the West was, that Sherman was able to take such a huge army and
march it hundreds of miles to help end the war in Virginia.
CWBR: Taking a step back then, how did black enlistment change the war
for both northern and southern in the western theater?
EH: Well, that is an interesting point. In a very superficial way, you could
say that it adds 180,000 troops to the Union army; that is a very; that is a gigantic
contribution and even though most of those 180,000 black troops did not
participate heavily in combat, they performed essential roles. The vast majority
of garrisons that were necessary to protect the Mississippi River after the fall of
Vicksburg consisted of black troops. Something like forty percent, I believe, of
all black troops raised by the Union army over all in the Civil War were raised
along the banks of the Mississippi River and those troops served almost their
entire service guarding the Mississippi for northern commerce and Union
military logistical support from July 4, 1863, until the end of the war. That is the
kind of service that does not get much publicity or credit because people tend to
focus on the battlefield instead of this sort of thing but it is fundamentally
important. In less obvious ways, in other words and maybe in ways that are
difficult to appreciate, in a kind of fundamental, underlying way, the recruitment
of 180,000 blacks into the Union army, in a practical military sense that had a big
import. You could look at it another way. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation,
which was the precedent for recruiting troops was arguably unconstitutional,
certainly on shaky grounds. But once you go putting 180,000 black men into blue
uniforms and give them a rifle and train them how to shoot it, that confirms that
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there is not going to be any backsliding in American history to try to resurrect
some form of legal slavery or anything like that. It was, I think, a necessary
important political and morale step intermediate between the Emancipation
Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment which was passed by Congress in, I
believe, late 1864 or early1865 perhaps. On the Confederate side, the
Confederates, as everyone knows, toyed with the idea of possibly raising black
troops, finally did so very late. Whether they would have had success if they had
the chance, at the time, to put it more fully into effect no one can tell. And, as
everyone knows, too, the deployment of black Union troops on the battlefield
tended to infuriate Confederate troops who oppose them, resulting in infamous
massacres of black troops at Fort Pillow, for example which I briefly discuss in
the book and in the eastern theater too. And also maltreatment, even if they are
not being massacred, often when black Union soldiers were captured by
Confederate soldiers they were mistreated or they were sold back into slavery or
they were used as labor instead of being treated as POWs as well.
CWBR: A simple question, perhaps with broader ramifications: At what
point was the war in the West officially settled in your eyes?
EH: Goodness, in terms of major activity by mainline forces, with Hood's
defeat at Nashville in mid-December of '64, coupled with the decision to transfer
what was left of the Army of Tennessee to North Carolina. Conceivably, if
Hood's force had remained in Mississippi after December of '64 it might have
done some more work too but after it was decided to shift Hood's forces, now
under Johnston, over to North Carolina that kind of ended it. There was the
matter of mopping up after that and there are some campaigns. Of course, there is
Wilson's big cavalry raid going through Alabama and into western Central
Georgia by the end of the war and there is Canby's long, long-deferred major
operation to capture Mobile in March and April of '65. But in hindsight, you can
see that both operations could easily have not happened and the war would have
come to an end when it did anyway but nobody could have foreseen that then.
But those kinds of mopping up operations are natural in such a huge expanse of
theater of operations like the West where there are lots and lots of targets. And
you have significant numbers of Union troops around so you might as well use
them and wind up the war because you do not know when it is going to end until
it does end.
CWBR: You have spent a great deal of time, in general, in studying both
eastern and western theaters. In your mind, was the United States Army of the
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Tennessee the most effective fighting force ever assembled?
EH: Yes, I would tend to say that. Given the comparatively modest size of
that field force, barely going above 30,000 men at any time period, and given its
limited resources in terms of well-trained staff officers, in terms of well-trained
engineers, it improvised an awful lot. It had a lot of tough fighting ability and a
lot of stamina, high morale and tremendous faith in their leaders, especially
Grant and Sherman and McPherson. I think they probably liked Howard maybe a
little bit less but I would, in fact, argue that Oliver Otis Howard was a better
commander of the army than McPherson was. McPherson made some real
mistakes in the Atlanta campaign even though he was a bright guy and a good
guy. So, yes, I would say so and, on the other end of the spectrum, the
Confederate Army of Tennessee, Bragg's force and Johnston's force, of course,
put in the least impressive record, I guess you could say of combat effectiveness
and successful campaigns, not necessarily because of any faults that rest on the
shoulders of the rank and file but for a variety of other reasons too, I suppose.
And the Army of the Cumberland, I would argue, is one of the more impressive
field forces in terms of high levels of professionalism and innovative
administrative efforts and all sorts of other things going on there too. So, I think
the western theater really provided some interesting stories and histories of
different units from the field armies on down to regiments that are unique in
American military history.
CWBR: Professor Hess, thank you for taking the time today to discuss The
Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from the Appalachians to the
Mississippi.
EH: Sure, I enjoyed it. Thank you.
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